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In a context of international concern about academic standards, the practice of external examining is 
widely admired for its role in defending standards.   Yet a contradiction exists between this faith in 
examining and continuing concerns about standards.  This article argues that external examining 
rests on assumptions about standards which are significantly open to challenge.  Six assumptions 
relating to the conceptual context, the operation and the nature of examiners themselves are 
analysed drawing on a review of the available evidence. The analysis challenges the notion of a 
consensus on standards and the potential to vest in individuals the ability to represent that 
consensus when judging the comparability of academic standards in a stable and appropriate way.  
The issues raised have relevance to the UK and to other national systems using external examiners 
or seeking to guarantee academic standards by, in some cases, adopting quality assurance 




 External examining: fit for purpose? 
 
External examining is a process by which the fairness of assessment and the academic standards in 
higher education are monitored. This monitoring normally involves an academic from another 
institution approving assessment tasks and examinations and checking a sample of student work for 
the courses which they examine.  A wider range of activities may also be included as discussed 
below.  In certain limited circumstances, for example in viva voces for research degrees, external 
examiners directly examine student performance.  In the case of vocational courses, some 
examiners may be practising members of the relevant profession rather than academics.  External 
examining is prevalent in the UK and several other countries operate or have operated an external 
examiner system: Ireland, New Zealand, Denmark, India, Malaysia, Brunei, Malawi, Hong Kong and 
South Africa (Harvey 2004-2012), although examiners’ roles differ across systems (Ross 2009, 475).  
Whilst this article necessarily focuses on the UK, the issues have wider relevance to other systems 
using external examiners and to other nations seeking to guarantee academic standards by, in some 
cases, adopting quality assurance approaches developed in the UK.   
 
It is claimed that British external examiner system provides ‘one of the principal means for 
maintaining UK threshold academic standards within autonomous higher education institutions’ 
(QAA 2012: B7, 2) through an accountability process which specifically addresses the quality of 
student performance.  Indeed, Gaunt (1999) suggests that external examining is the only quality 
assurance mechanism that directly addresses quality of student output and argues that it is the most 
highly regarded of UK accountability measures. However while the system is widely admired 
(Watson 2006) for its role in defending academic standards there are increasing concerns about 
those standards in the UK and elsewhere (HEFCE 2009; Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills 
Committee 2009; QAA 2009; Coates 2010). This apparent contradiction warrants closer scrutiny and 
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 this article argues that the relationship between external examining and academic standards rests 
on assumptions which are significantly open to challenge.  
The language of the new UK Quality Code for higher education (QAA 2012) appears to signal a 
tentative down grading of the external examiner as the prime guardian of standards and a subtle 
transformation in official views of the role.  The rationale for changing the scope of external 
examiners’ responsibilities may be an attempt to tackle continuing criticisms of the operation of the 
system, echoing as it does the recommendations of the most recent enquiry into the role by 
Universities UK (2011).  However, the Universities UK report and the new code that has emerged 
remain silent on crucial assumptions about the nature of academic standards as understood and 
applied by external examiners.  So, at a time when the higher education system is changing to 
include more private providers and will be populated by fee paying students with high expectations 
of reliability and fairness in marking, this is a timely point to critically examine those assumptions 
that underpin the system.  
Whilst there have been various studies of external examining, those that consider examiners’ 
consistency in both understanding and applying academic standards have been singularly lacking in 
recent years with the exception of Colley and Silver (2005).  The last significant academic enquiry 
dates back to Silver et al. (1995) and Warren Piper (1994).  On the other hand, official reports and 
commentaries which discuss external examining abound.  Despite this plethora of enquiries and 
recommendations, reforms have been criticised for their limited impact in tackling the failings of the 
system (Attwood  2010).    The aim of this article is to test the premise for perceiving external 
examiners as a mainstay for protecting academic standards by examining the assumptions on which 
the system is based.  It differs from recent previous enquiries on external examining by focusing on 
academic standards rather than examining procedures.  It also differs from official reports in 
adopting a scholarly approach; applying developing educational research in the field of higher 




Purpose and history of external examining  
External examining is a mandatory, ‘long standing and crucial feature of British Higher Education’ 
(HEQC  1996a,   7).  It has existed in some form since the early nineteenth century, gradually 
becoming adopted by new universities as a means of demonstrating the credibility of their standards 
(Silver and Williams  1996).  However in recent decades a lack of confidence in academic standards 
has emerged, largely prompted by massification of higher education, and has led to concerns that 
the existing system is no longer able to warrant comparable standards across universities (Silver and 
Williams  1996).  It is a system that is seen to be ‘under strain’ (HEFCE, 2009) and in need of ‘repair’ 
(Innovation, Universities, Science and Skills Committee  2009).  Criticisms have tended to focus on a 
lack of consistency in examiners’ appointment and role (HEQC  1994) and the variability in examining 
practices in different programmes, subject disciplines and universities, resulting from weak or 
inconsistent institutional processes (QAA  2005).  In addition they express worries about the 
potential for ‘cosy’ relationships between examiners and departments (Universities UK and others  
2010,  paras 20 and 36). There are also concerns about clarity (HEFCE  2009) and authority (BIS  
2009) in the examiners’ role in assuring standards (HEFCE  2009) as they move to more of a critical 
friend role than one of arbiter of standards.  
 
Some reports debate the notion of national standards.  In the 1990s, Silver and Williams (1996, 42) 
concluded that there was little acceptance of the idea of ‘national’ standards, but they considered 
that external examining was more feasible as a means of comparing standards at the level of the 
subject.  Examiners’ appointment from similar types of institutions, or with similar programmes and 
assessment methods means that ‘comparability of standards can only be achieved within fairly 
narrow and clearly defined parameters’ (HEQC  1996a,  para 24.2).   But, even with that proviso, 
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 Gaunt (1999) points to the difficulty of external examiners providing for reliability. As Sadler (2011) 
points out, calibration’ of individuals’ assessment standards in general is lacking.  
The recent Universities UK (2011) report on external examiners seems to acknowledge this when it  
states that examiners cannot guarantee strict comparability of standards between programmes, only 
broad comparability with an emphasis on programme diversity but consensus over  ‘threshold’ 
standards (para 12).  This is reflected in the new Quality Code for UK higher education which states 
that external examiners:  
‘are also able to offer an informed view of how standards compare with the same or similar 
awards at other higher education institutions (primarily in the UK, and sometimes overseas 
as well) of which they have experience.’ (QAA  UK Quality Code for higher education, chapter 
B7 external examining, p2 – our emphasis) 
A further indication that the role of the examiner is now considered to be less authoritative figures 
elsewhere in the new UK Quality Code for UK higher education (QAA  2012) which states: 
 
‘the external examiner is only one of a number of sources of external opinion 
which institutions consider, including external advice received through approval, 
monitoring and review processes. External examiners are therefore not the sole 
guarantors of the comparability of standards achieved.’ (p9) 
 
However, whilst the contribution of external examiners has arguably been reduced, none of these 
successive reports or research projects rejects the external examiner model. Furthermore, they do 
not present a fundamental challenge to the notion that a system of independent examiners can 
make a major contribution to safeguarding standards, albeit within a more limited domain. For 
example, Universities UK (2011) states ‘The overwhelming body of opinion from the responses is 
6 
 
 that the external examining system works well on the whole, and does not require a major overhaul’ 
(para 8).  Instead, each report has recommended improvements in the system.  For example the 
Dearing report (1997) recommended a pool of accredited examiners, consistent training for external 
examiners and, archiving scripts to help maintain standards over time.  More recently, the QAA 
(2009) recommended that the External examiner system should be more transparent and better 
explained; there should be improved procedures to identify and support external examiners and a 
set of minimum expectations of those holding the role.  The Universities UK report in 2011 
recommends greater transparency, minimum expectations and criteria for the appointment of 
examiners, and enhanced induction.  In addition, it recommends core content in examiners’ reports 
and a right of access to those reports by students on the programme.  In general, diagnoses of 
external examiner problems have been repetitive and the solutions, we would argue, have 
concentrated on fixing the easier challenges of protocols and practice (Universities UK  2010; 2011).  
Such reports and inquiries fail to investigate the more fundamental question of whether examiners 
understand and can consistently apply academic standards in the way required by their, albeit 
possibly confused, role as defenders of academic standards.  This is even though, as Brooks (2012) 
asserts, most concerns about standards can be traced back to the judgement processes of markers 
and examiners.    
 
This policy context forms the background for the remainder of this paper in which we shall consider 
this fundamental question about the relationship between external examining and academic 
standards by considering the assumptions that underpin the system.  We shall do this in three 
domains: the conceptual context for examining, the operation of the system and the nature of 
examiners, themselves.  The assumptions selected have been judged by the authors to be implicit in 
the policy and its operation and the justification for choosing each one is outlined in the relevant 




The conceptual context 
 
The notion of an external examiner system traditionally rests on a conceptualisation of standards as 
something about which there can be a community consensus.  Such a community consensus is a 
necessary pre-requisite to individuals making judgements about appropriate academic standards 
and the comparability of outputs by students across institutions.  
  
Assumption 1 
A community consensus on academic standards can have enduring stability over time and across 
programmes, departments and universities; 
In order to discuss this assumption, it is necessary to consider what we mean by academic standards.  
For the purposes of this article, we use the term ‘academic standards’ to describe standards of 
student attainment as this ‘output’ definition enjoys a broad consensus (Bloxham and Boyd  2011). 
This definition also distinguishes academic standards from quality standards, the latter of which 
apply to aspects such the qualifications of staff, the design of the curriculum or the availability of 
resources as indicators of the quality of a university programme .  However, questions about the 
meaning of academic standards remain.  Indeed, as an HEQC report (1996c,  1) states ‘The absence 
of a clear understanding of the meaning of academic standards in the expanded, diversified and 
modularised world of higher education’ hinders the debate about comparability.   
Customary descriptions of external examining hold conceptions of standards which lie in a techno-
rationalist standards discourse. They are based on assumptions that ‘knowledge is monolithic, static 
and universal’ (Delandshere  2001, 127) with staff acculturated into ‘guild knowledge’ (Sadler  1989).     
On the basis of this epistemology, although statements of standards were rarely articulated in the 
past, there was an assumption pre-massification (Silver and Williams  1996, 27) that a ‘gold 
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 standard’ existed; fixed benchmarks which enshrined the standards of the ancient universities.  Such 
a perspective sees standards as independent of the individuals who created or are custodians of 
them.  Whilst the notion of national standards has since been disputed, the underpinning discourse 
of quality assurance and examining continues to privilege this techno-rationalist conception.  Yorke 
(2008, 27) links this discourse to a ‘measurement’ model and a ‘realist’ perspective on assessment.   
However, such discourse sits in contrast to the hermeneutic approach which is ‘grounded in the 
philosophical and scientific tradition of phenomenology’ (Broad  2000, 244).  This tradition includes a 
socio-cultural perspective which ‘emphasises the situatedness of practice’ and a social constructivist 
approach which ‘emphasises the constructedness of knowledge’ (Shay  2008, 596).  Such a 
philosophy is interpretive and conceives of staff as active agents in co-creating standards through 
local assessment practices and communities.  It argues that, in contrast to the gold standard 
approach, there is growing theoretical argument and empirical evidence for the notion that 
individuals construct their own ‘standards frameworks’ (Ashworth et al. 2010). This occurs despite 
the evidence that tutors think their standards are the same (Warren Piper  1994,  79).  This 
conceptualisation of ‘standards frameworks’ is supported by work in the broader fields of higher 
education research on assessment and marking.  For example, similar notions of this concept have 
been generated such as ‘[t]eachers’ conceptions of quality’ (Sadler  1989),   assessors’ ‘evaluative 
frameworks’ (Broad  2003), ‘assessors’ interpretive frameworks’ (Shay  2005,   665) individuals’ 
‘concepts and interpretations’ (Wolf  1995,  67-8) and ‘pre-formed knowledge structures’ (Crisp  
2008,  250).  Such perspectives emerge from different traditions but they all emphasise the 
interpretive, personalised and subjective nature of standards, learnt informally through active 
participation in relevant communities and practices and lacking the characteristics that would enable 
a broad and enduring consensus.  Yorke (2008) links this paradigm to a ‘judgement’ model and a 




 As Shay (2005)  argues, the interpretive framework that each examiner holds combines objective 
elements learnt from participation in the relevant field, and highly subjective elements arising from 
the local context of assessment and dependent on the assessor. ‘From this perspective assessment is 
situationally contingent, rooted in local cultures and reliable and robust only in terms of sets of 
assumptions, attitudes and values which are, in part at least, localized’ (2005,  669).  Such standards 
are not ‘immutable’ (Sadler  1987, 196) or independent of individuals (Shay  2005,  677).  These 
individualised standards appear to survive regardless of social opportunities to negotiate and 
construct shared standards.  For example, numerous studies over time show low agreement 
between higher education assessors (Sadler  1987; Elander and Hardman  2002; Bloxham  2009; 
Shay  2004; Leach et al. 2001; Wolf 1995).  As Broad (2003, 74) states, research shows that 
‘standards refuse[d] to be as solid, stable and portable an entity as participants wished’. 
Fundamentally, the notion that we can establish standards independently from the individuals who 
are using them is challenged:  
‘We are social beings who construe the world according to our values and perceptions; thus, 
our biographies are central to what we see and how we interpret it.  Similarly in assessment, 
performance is not “objective”; rather, it is construed according to the perspectives and 
values of the assessor’.  (Gipps  1999,  370) 
Thus, from this latter perspective, the simplistic and fixed notions of standards as portrayed in public 
debate deny the necessarily elusive and dynamic nature of academic standards which are 
continuously co-constructed by academics.   
Whether one adopts a techno-rational or hermeneutic approach to standards, the issue of 
consensus is further hampered by the fact that standards generally constitute tacit as well as explicit 
knowledge; their oral and implicit nature meaning that it is difficult to detect drifts in standards 
(Sadler  1987,  192).  Therefore, although at a fairly general and abstract level, higher education 
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 assessors do share a significant measure of agreement about what they are looking for in student 
work (Warren Piper 1994), that does not establish consensus regarding the standards by which these 
aspects of work will be assessed.  Despite the view of Silver and Williams (1996,  42) that a ‘more 
attainable goal’ is a broad view of external examining with more ‘vague and indefinable’ standards 
(p44), reports on standards in external examining continue to presume a consensus on academic 
standards, at least at a discipline/ programme level. However the new UK Quality Code (QAA  2012) 
indicates that examiners’ contribution should be to the management of ‘threshold’ standards (p4). 
The insertion of ‘threshold’ in relation to standards is interesting in itself in what it signals about 
trust in examiners’ capacity to reflect community consensus regarding standards although why 
‘threshold’ standards are more important or easier to determine than, for example differences 




In this section, we will consider two assumptions that underpin the effective operation of the 
external examiner system.  
 
Assumption 2 
There is a common understanding of the external examiner role. 
 
In recent years, the role of external examiner has become more diverse and includes conceptions of 
the examiner as arbiter of standards, external reference point and critical friend.  In 1996, the HEQC 
(1996a) study found four conceptions of the examiners’ role: additional examiner, moderator, 
calibrator and consultant and the Silver report (Silver et al.  1995) found mixed views about 
extending the role towards a more advisory or consultancy function for both principled and 
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 pragmatic reasons.  In more recent times, as Yorke (2008,  103) notes, examiners have become 
‘more remote’ from students’ actual work as programmes of study have become modularised.  Their 
role has shifted away from looking at samples of students’ work and towards assuring the integrity 
of the processes for assessment and award’.  For example, it is often no longer considered 
appropriate for external examiners to change individual student’s marks (QAA  2012) even though 
institutional regulations generally permit this. 
 
One might argue that a common understanding of the role in relation to standards is not necessary. 
The potential conflict between the general academic advising role and the ability to take an 
objective stance in relation to student performance was considered and dismissed as no ‘real 
danger’ by the Lindop Report (Lindop Committee  1985); indeed it is a challenge that academics face 
on a daily basis.  However, there is a danger in this changing context that some interpretations may 
be less effective in terms of examiners’ contribution to verifying and maintaining academic 
standards.  Examiners who operate in a consultant or critical friend role are more likely to focus on 
the standards of academic ‘input’ and ‘process’ rather than ‘output’.  The failure of quality 
assurance, such as external examining, to focus on academic standards as output is a criticism posed 
by a number of writers (Harvey  2002; Alderman  2009; Middlehurst  1996).  Alderman (2009) argues 
that such a focus is underpinned by the view that high standards will be maintained by standardised 
procedures, a view which he considers ‘false and dangerous’ (13).  His opinion is supported by other 
research, for example on the extent to which double marking achieves consistency (Yorke  2008) or 
accuracy (Satchell and Pratt  2010) and on the failure of tightly managed assessment procedures to 
create an effective experience for students (Crook et al.  2006).   
 
On the other hand, an approach that positions examiners as arbiters of standardised procedures 
rather than arbiters of standards may be an implicit acceptance that giving them such strong power 
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 over determining standards is not working; a potential response to lack of trust in either the 
examining system or individual examiner’s knowledge and judgement. This is reinforced by the new 
Quality Code establishing external examiners as ‘only one part, albeit a very important part’ of the 
quality assurance of the UK higher Education system (QAA  2012: section B7, 3). Whilst, the Code 
also sets out an expectation that higher education providers make scrupulous use of external 
examiners, it confirms a wide ranging view of examiners’ functions, clearly stating that it does not 
‘assume a specific model of assessment oversight’ (5).  This situation, adopted in acknowledgement 
of institutional differences, challenges the assumption that there is either a specified role for 
examiners or a common understanding of the examiners’ role. 
 
Assumption 3 
There are processes in place that support the development of consensus regarding standards which 
enables them to be understood and consistently applied by examiners. 
 
Efforts to record and monitor standards began in the UK with the establishment of the Council for 
National Academic Awards (CNAA) in 1964 with subsequent work seeking to make academic 
standards more explicit and consistent in an effort to support consensus in the sector.  In particular, 
developments include a Framework For Higher Education Qualifications at the system level, Subject 
Benchmark Statements and Professional standards at the discipline level and assessment criteria, 
grade descriptors and specified learning outcomes at the institutional, departmental and 
programme level.  These developments have all been based on the belief that previously elusive 
standards could be made more explicit through techniques such as benchmarking (Woolf and 
Cooper  1999) although there was some reluctance from subject associations fearing that efforts to 
create greater comparability of standards in this way might lead to over standardisation of the 
curriculum (HEQC  1996b).  The Silver Report (Silver et al.  1995) asserts that ‘[c]onsistency (in 
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 standards) is the outcome of institutions defining and implementing their own standards in the 
context of appropriate external frameworks and scrutiny’ (p42). In relation to external examining, 
such codification is considered important in guaranteeing consistency of standards (Universities UK 
and others  2010). 
However such explicit standards promise more than they can deliver (Hawe  2002) and O’Donovan 
et al. (2004) stress the futility of trying to define standards precisely thereby confirming  problems 
identified by Sadler (1987).  He argues that (205) fuzzy standards cannot be transformed into sharp 
standards by simply using more detailed language.   
Moss and Schutz (2001) provide a useful exploration of the creation and use of explicit standards for 
judgement, drawing on teaching standards as their exemplar.  Their philosophical argument is based 
on Habermas’(1996) view that the moral justification for laws (or in this case standards) comes from 
the fact that they are created through rational consensus with relevant representatives of the 
community involved in drawing up the standards; ‘a fair dialogue among equals’ (Moss and Shutz, 
40) .  They argue that attempting to seek a consensus leads groups to produce too general or 
abstract standards, often based on compromise rather than consensus, which hide complexity and 
can mask diversity as those involved strive to complete the task in a limited time frame.  Once 
standards are written, the system operates outside the control of the standard setting group.  This 
means that we need standards which are created by this democratic dialogue but which can be used 
independently as ‘fixed guidelines’ (p42).  Drawing on Habermas’ presuppositions about discourse 
ethics, Moss and Shutz discuss the assumption underlying written standards that those involved 
‘confer(red) identical meanings on the expressions they employ(ed)’ (Habermas  1996,  19) and that 
the ‘expressions (will) keep the same meaning in the diverse situations …. in which they are 
employed’ (p11).   Standards have to be used interpretively for individual examples (as in judges 
interpreting the law in relation to specific cases) but this interpretation should not fall outside what 
was determined by the community consensus that drew them up.  However, in their empirical study 
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 of just such a group, they showed how it failed to produce something which can be used 
independently by assessors for several reasons.  These include the fact that assessors’ understanding 
of terms differs because of their previous experience, also found in Hawe (2002); although group 
members may agree to use the same words, this doesn’t assure agreement about their meaning.  
These findings have been reflected in a range subjects and contexts (see for example  Martin and 
Cloke  2000; Tang  2008; Brooks  2012). Overall Moss and Shutz (2001) argue that judgement 
becomes an ‘interpretation’ of standards not a ‘reflection’ of them.   
Of further interest is the failure of explicit statements to be grounded in empirical study of the 
standards assessors actually use (Milanovic et al.  1996) or students’ actual performance (Greatorex  
2000) which is fundamentally important.  As Sadler (1987, 196) says, standards must be grounded in 
field experience not in theory; that is, what people actually draw on to make their judgement, not 
what they think the standards should be. For example, Shay (2008, 598) argues that criteria don’t 
reflect everything valued by academics (e.g. subject knowledge). She suggests the power of these 
documents to secure consistency may be limited by their focus on ‘academic and intellectual skills’, 
privileging those achievements at the expense of discursive or propositional knowledge.  
In relation to research specifically on external examiners, there are interesting findings regarding 
their use of information to enable them to represent community standards.  For example, Ross 
(2009) argues that examiners are still bounded by their social and cultural environment and 
expectations, and Colley and Silver’s (2005) research identifies the importance of personal 
experience of both standards and quality assurance processes in providing examiners’ reference 
points, with less significance given to Academic Infrastructure  and other formal reference points 
(also see Hawe  2002; QAA  2005).  The most important information, from the point of view of 
examiners was the assessment guidance and criteria for individual tasks within courses although it 
could be argued that this is more likely to represent local rather than community standards.  Module 
and departmental information was seen as more important than institutional information and, in 
15 
 
 many cases, professional body standards were not used by external examiners as they were seen as 
only loosely related to academic standards.  At root, it seems that despite a couple of decades 
attempting to build an infrastructure of explicit standards, the successful operation of external 
examining still rests with the individuals concerned as suggested in 1996: 
‘Ultimately, academic standards are established through the exercise of expert judgement 
by the examiners in their own field of expertise.  This remains true regardless of whether the 
institution has sophisticated quality assurance procedures or whether explicit criteria have 
been evolved to aid the setting of standards.  Such procedures and specifications should be 
viewed as a means of supporting and demonstrating high professional standards’ (HEQC  




In the light of the last comment, it is important to consider certain existing assumptions regarding 
the capacities of individual examiners to meet the purposes of the examining system.  This includes 
their knowledge of standards, their capacity to apply those standards appropriately and consistently 
and their understanding of the complexity of professional judgement and assessment procedures 
more generally.  
 
Assumption 4 
External Examiners have ‘extensive knowledge of academic standards, at least within a discipline or 
subject area, and across the sector’ (HEQC  1996a, 31)  
 
This assumption underpins the idea that external examiners can provide consistent independent 
judgement which justifies privileging their perspective as ‘guardian of the ‘standards’’ (Shay  2005,  
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 674).   Norcini and Shea (1997) argue that in order to gain credibility for standards, standard setters 
should be suitably qualified. However the very nature of external examining, with a small number of 
examiners often covering a whole degree scheme, means that they may well be passing judgement 
on the standards of work outside their domain of expert knowledge.  In addition, Colley and Silver 
(2005) point out that examiners, by and large, only examine in a limited range of universities with 
exposure only to standards in those institutions.   Reports on external examining (Silver et al.  1995; 
QAA  2007) confirm these concerns regarding the power of examiners to secure community 
standards; examiners are working within a bounded sector of HE institutions and thus may not have 
wide enough experience of different institutions.   
Indeed, efforts to improve their knowledge of standards may be restricted by notions of academic 
freedom.   Warren Piper (1994) suggests that examiners actively resist the introduction of technical 
routines for regulating judgement as a threat to their autonomy.  Similarly Hawe (2002) argues that 
academics more generally may reject explicit standards as deskilling and a threat to their 
professional autonomy or humanistic views of teaching and learning.  From this perspective, perhaps 
the ongoing deliberations about external examining are essentially part of a ‘tussle’ (Sadler  2011) 
between academic autonomy and institutional or government authority?  Interestingly, there is an 
argument that academic freedom includes the freedom, as experts, to assign grades without 
interference by the wider university although the law in the UK and legal cases in the USA contradict 
this interpretation (Hill  2011).   
The assumption of examiner knowledge relies on the notion that standards exist objectively and 
separately from individual examiners, albeit with possible differences across disciplines and 
universities. The foregoing debate about the individualised nature of standards would posit a more 
informal view of examiners’ knowledge of standards. The interpretive perspective would tend to 
emphasise the notion of examiners learning, not through reference to documentation and explicit 
standards, but through being part of an assessment community.  Indeed, Colley and Silver (2005) 
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 found that examiners claim to learn from seeing other externals at work and some from learning and 
teaching networks. Induction was only mentioned by one of the groups of examiners researched.  
However, whilst Silver and Hannan (2004) found a range of motivations for becoming an examiner 
including making a contribution to the academic community and gaining intelligence about other 
institutions’ programmes, none of them included calibrating their sense of standards.  Therefore, as 
Ross (2009) argues, examiners bring their beliefs, values and assumptions to the task and it is 
presumptive to assume that extensive knowledge of academic standards is included.   
 
Assumption 5 
External examiners can represent community standards reliably and consistently and do not suffer 
from the same type of frailties exhibited by other assessors. 
In order to explore this assumption, we are drawing on research on higher education grading 
because passing judgement on the quality of student work remains central to how examiners 
discharge their responsibilities.  
Drawing on the hermeneutic approach discussed earlier, marking student work is conceived of as a 
socially situated interpretive act where the meaning of standards is constituted through the 
discursive practice (dialogue and language) which takes place in the social, cultural and political 
contexts concerned.  Shay (2005, 664) states ‘interpretations [of standards] are contextually 
constituted and cannot be divorced from the value-bases which interpreters bring with them.  
Differences between markers are not ‘error’, but rather the inescapable outcome of the multiplicity 
of perspectives that assessors bring with them’.  For this reason, tutors’ perspectives on standards 
differ depending on other social worlds that assessors inhabit (Den Outer et al.  2012) their history 
and values (Dobson  2008b) and their previous experience (Milanovic et al.  1996).  Drawing on a 
different epistemological approach, Sadler (1987, 204) argues that people achieve their knowledge 
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 of standards’ through ‘inductive cognitive processes’, reinforcing the importance of personal 
experience in developing a sense of standards.   
 
Thus, individuals’ standards’ frameworks, as defined earlier, are constructed and reconstructed over 
time by reference, amongst other things, to specialist knowledge, other tutors’ marking, students’ 
work, involvement in moderation and examiners’ feedback. This creates a unique lens through which 
tutors and thus examiners, read and judge student work (Bloxham and Boyd  2011).  Undoubtedly, 
this personalised knowledge of standards is mediated by the power of shared, situated learning.  
Eisner (1985) refers to this process as the use of ‘connoisseurship’; the well-informed subjective 
judgement which accrues through immersion in a subject discipline.  A number of writers have 
tackled this issue in the context of higher education assessment (Shay  2005; Orr  2010).  The 
argument suggests that whilst teachers develop their own standards frameworks, ‘individual 
lecturers’ assessment responses are constituted collectively’ (Orr  2010,  15) as activities such as 
moderation and external examining help to build an intersubjective consensus.  Thus ‘standards’ 
frameworks merge as common standards are continually negotiated (Orr  2010).  For example, 
Dobson (2008a, 337) provides examples of how assessors working together over a long period had 
established ‘rarely articulated in-the-head normative agreement’ about grades.  The question is 
whether this in-the-head agreement reflects a merging of standards which is sufficient or 
widespread enough in general to claim that markers are representing wider community standards.  
Furthermore, in relation to external examiners, the question is whether as members of an academic 
community, they have engaged sufficiently with the practices of that community to acquire a strong 
and shared understanding of standards which they can transfer to, and articulate in, new settings.  
The evidence for ‘intersubjectivity’ (Bruner  1996,  20) is not very compelling in the context of higher 
education assessment.  It is an untenably positive view of how shared standards are acquired and 
used in practice, whether by academics in general or by external examiners in particular.  Whilst the 
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 material in the following paragraphs is not propounded as a criticism of academic teachers but a 
recognition of the complex and intuitive nature of judgement at this level, it does indicate a range of 
ways in which judgement in grading is shown to be problematic. How confident can we be that 
external examiners are not subject to the same vagaries in practice? 
Overall, assessors’ unreliability is well documented (Brooks  2012).   Milanovic et al. (1996) point to 
the marker as a recognised source of error and Moss and Shultz (2001) indicate that, even where 
assessors agree pass and fail, they do so for different reasons.  Milanovic et al. (1996) identify a 
range of studies showing that markers focus on different aspects of student composition, for 
example, content, length, accuracy, vocabulary or no one thing but more the ‘environment of the 
essays – the effect of the papers’ (Vaughan  1991).  Elander and Hardman (2002) also report that 
tutors vary in what they look for (cues) in assessing work and this contributes to variance in marks.   
 
Furthermore, research points to the influence of students’ work on assessors’ judgement. The 
‘techno-rationalist paradigm’ as expressed in most guidance to tutors advocates that we should base 
our assessment on criterion rather than norm referencing so that a student is judged against a set of 
standards, not against his or her peers.  This distinction has been criticised (Orr  2008; Neil and 
Wadley  1999; Yorke  2009).  In particular, Yorke makes the point that ‘assessors’ grading behaviour 
is tacitly influenced by norm referencing and Vaughan (1991), Shay (2004), Delaney (2005) and Orrell 
(2008) also found that tutors draw on their knowledge of different students’ work in order to make 
their judgements.  More broadly, Crisp (2008) and Bloxham et al. (2011) found that other students’ 
work affects individuals’ standards’ frameworks.  There is no evidence that external examiners will 
not be influenced in the same way in making their judgements.  In particular, following this 
argument, examiners’ (sometimes limited) exposure to a range of student work as comparators is 
likely to affect their sense of standards. 
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 A further weakness in academics’ ability to represent community standards relates to their limited 
use of codified standards within and across institutions.  Empirical studies (see Hawe  2002; Broad  
2003; Greatorex  2000; Dobson  2008a) have found that assessors use personal criteria beyond or 
different to those stated including contextual factors.   Colley and Silver’s (2005) evidence that 
external examiners draw mostly on their own experience rather than documented statements of 
standards tends to reinforce this point and contradicts the assumption that they do not suffer from 
the same type of frailties exhibited by other assessors. 
Some studies (see Dobson  2008a; Broad  2003; Elander and Hardman  2002) have shown that 
knowledge of the student influences tutors’ judgement.  As ‘outsiders’, external examiners might be 
considered less susceptible to this weakness although the degree to which they resist the appeals of 
the home assessors in relation to taking into account aspects of the student has yet to be researched 
except in relation to viva voce examinations  (Dobson  2008a).  He found that where there is a face 
to face encounter, examiners cannot avoid taking into account aspects of individuals, suggesting that 
contextual factors are more likely to influence examiners in a viva although they will have impact in 
other judgements.  Dobson (2008a) shows how grades are negotiated in dialogue and that norm 
referencing remains prevalent in examiners’ decisions (Dobson  2008b). 
More generally, psychological enquiry tends to challenge assumptions of expert judgement 
considered to underpin external examining.  Using the ‘Heuristics and Biases’ approach, research 
(Gilovich et al. 2002) suggests that expert judgement in cases of uncertainty or complexity utilises a 
number of simplifying cues (heuristics) because a more rational and detailed judgement is too 
difficult or time consuming.  Such heuristics allow for systematic biases to creep in of which the 
expert is unaware  and may lead to assessors predicting performance in advance of completing 
reading (Crisp  2008).  For example, recent research has identified that knowledge of the student, 
group stereotyping and surface features of work can be sources of bias (Brooks  2012; Kangis  2001; 
Hartley et al. 2006).  
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 The extent to which external examiners do not suffer from the same type of frailties exhibited by 
other assessors is under-researched but examiners’ reliance on personal experience (Colley and 
Silver  2005) tends to confirm the importance of personal standards frameworks as compared with 
shared standards.   Yet, despite this lack of evidence that they can represent disciplinary community 
standards, as opposed to local or personal, standards, we ask them to play an elevated role with an 
expectation that they are able to hold and use standards in a reliable and mutually consistent way.   
 
Assumption 6 
External examiners understand the complexity of professional judgement and higher education 
assessment processes. 
 
This discussion of the assumptions underpinning external examining has uncovered the complex 
nature of academic standards and its implications.  External examiners hold major responsibilities; 
they are held in considerable esteem by tutors (Bloxham and Boyd  2011) and by the sector in 
general (Watson  2006; Gaunt  1999) and their existence is considered to be a key quality assurance 
mechanism.  Yet what confidence can we have that the average external examiner has the 
‘assessment literacy’ to be aware of the complex influences on their standards and judgement 
processes? How likely are they to understand the provenance of their own standards and the 
influence of their background and experience?  How strong is the temptation to draw largely on 
their personal experience as an indicator of what standards should be rather than recognising the 
potential bias in that approach, or the influence of a particular context or student body or 
professional experience?  Sadler (2011) discusses the rationale for academics’ ability in general to 
act autonomously in judging the standards of student work and it includes their qualifications, 
research and exposure to standards elsewhere in the sector.  He challenges this rationale with 
arguments that  academics are not qualified to act autonomously because they are not qualified or 
22 
 
 skilled in assessment. Likewise, less recently, Yorke et al. (2000) suggest that few academics have 
expertise in assessment and in the first major, detailed survey of the external examining system 
(ESRC  1989), it was reported that ‘the judgement and actions of examiners are largely informed by 
experience and knowledge of their subject and very little informed by the equally pertinent body of 
knowledge about the examination and the measurement of human performance’ (p30). 
Colley and Silver (2005) also argue for the need for external examiners to accept other assessment 
cultures and not to carry too much ‘baggage’.  Indeed Biggs (2002) writes convincingly about the 
potential of examiners to counteract enhancement in assessment practice because of their lack of 
knowledge of assessment.  The Dearing report (NCIHE 1997) claimed that standards are a shared 
responsibility of the whole HE community but such a view doesn’t deal with the complexity of 
problems created by knowing, using and continually reconstructing standards as external examiners.  
Unfortunately successive enquiries into examining have not tackled these issues.   
 
Conclusion 
 The external examiner system plays a key role in assuring academic standards. This article has 
identified and questioned the validity of the assumptions which underpin the system.  Essentially, 
external examining assumes that there is a consensus on standards and that we can vest in 
individuals the ability to represent that consensus in judging the comparability of academic 
standards in a stable and appropriate way for any given programme or set of modules.  Yet the 
critique of these six assumptions challenges the notion of the examiner as an independent objective 
voice (Shay  2005) and one might argue that such a challenge holds greater sway now than it did in 
the past given the massification of higher education and the limited dialogue and sharing of 
standards across universities.  As Shay (2005,  674) says, quality ‘systems rely on consistency 
between independent judgement and privilege (at least officially) the perspective of the external 
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 examiner who is appointed guardian of the ‘standards’’.  Yet the assumptions on which that 
guardianship is founded are, if not disproven, certainly lacking in sound supporting evidence.  
 
It is difficult to argue against the external examiner system at the level of principle.  Given all that 
has been discussed in this paper about the social construction of standards and, therefore, the 
important benefits of inter-institutional sharing and debating of them as the basis for a community 
consensus, the systematised opportunity for academics to examine their peers’ standards makes 
good sense.  It is in the detail that this principle is threatened.  Inquiries into the role (for example, 
Universities UK  2011) have chosen to tackle problems through tightening up procedures and 
induction and making the role and examiners’ reports more transparent and accessible.  They have 
not focused on addressing the fundamental assumptions on which the principled role is based and 
therefore, we can have little confidence that enhanced procedures will deliver the desired change.  
The system is expensive and, if the resources are to continue to be devoted to it, it might be sensible 
to research further the conditions under which external examining could meet its aims for 
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